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Sophie Vanhoonacker (Maastricht)
A Revival of the Benelux?
Seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre scheint die Benelux neuen Auftrieb erhalten zu haben, nicht als
internationale Organisation, aber in Form einer engeren Zusammenarbeit ihrer Mitglieder im Rahmen
der EU. Durch eine Reihe von Memoranda betreffend die zukünftige Entwicklung der EU und spezifische
Themen, wie Justiz- und Innenpolitik, waren sie bemüht, den Prozess der europäischen Integration in
Richtung einer Vertiefung voranzutreiben. Durch ihren Zusammenschluss versuchen sie, größeren
Einfluss auszuüben und die Interessen kleinerer Staaten besser zu vertreten. Gute persönliche
Beziehungen auf höchster politischer Ebene haben bei der Herstellung der Verbindungen eine große
Rolle gespielt.
Die engeren Beziehungen bedeuten allerdings nicht den Beginn einer ménage à trois. Die
Kooperation findet in erster Linie auf höchster Ebene (zwischen den MinisterpräsidentInnen) statt
und ist in sehr flexibler und pragmatischer Weise organisiert. Die Kooperation ist keineswegs
allumfassend, und es bestehen weiterhin wichtige ökonomische, kulturelle und politische Unterschiede
zwischen den drei Ländern. Sie ist auch keineswegs exklusiv, sondern Teil einer breiteren Strategie
der Netzwerkbildung innerhalb der EU.
1. Introduction
The Benelux is by many still associated with
the customs union set up in 1944 amongst Bel-
gium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. As its
objectives have since long been realised in the
much broader framework of the EU, the organi-
sation has today a somewhat anachronistic and
even moribund connotation. Since the mid-
1990s, however, the Benelux seems to have re-
ceived new impulses, not as an international
organisation but as a form of closer coopera-
tion amongst the three countries in the frame-
work of the EU.1  During the Intergovernmen-
tal Conferences (IGCs) leading to the Amster-
dam and the Nice Treaty and in the Convention
on the future of the EU, the Benelux countries
have put forward joint memoranda outlining
their views with regard to some of the major
issues on the agenda.2  In addition they have also
issued two memoranda on cooperation in the
field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).3  It is
interesting to note that the Benelux organisa-
tion itself plays no role in this cooperation.
This article examines the cooperation between
these three countries in the framework of the
European Union in recent years. What are their
motivations to try to speak with one voice on
certain EU issues? Why does the co-ordination
of positions occur at this moment in time? What
could the possible impact of such cooperation
be? What are the advantages or possible disad-
vantages for the countries in question? Is it just
an ad hoc initiative or is it the beginning of a
more structured relationship? Before address-
ing these questions, the cooperation will be
placed in the broader context of a general trend
in the EU to form cores and coalitions, and the
relations between the Benelux countries will be
situated in a historic context.
2. On Cores and Coalitions4
The attempt of a smaller group of EU mem-
ber states of the same geographical area to closer
co-operate or to form a privileged partnership
is not an isolated event in the EU. Also the Nor-
8dic countries co-ordinate positions in the frame-
work of the EU and with the Visegrad group,
we have an example of cooperation amongst
prospective member states. Regional partner-
ships are, however, just one of the expressions
of a general trend to closer cooperate amongst a
limited group of member states. The debate on
regional partnerships cannot be seen independ-
ently of the broader discussions on:
 flexibility or closer cooperation (Title VII
of the Treaty on European Union);
 the formation of an avant-garde or pioneer
group;
 the formation of a directorate amongst the
three biggest member states in the framework
of Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP).
Since the launching of the so-called Schäuble-
Lamers paper (September 1994)5 , when two
prominent members of the German Christian
Democratic party first openly pleaded for the
formation of a hard core of a small group of
member states, the debate on closer coopera-
tion in the EU has taken full swing. In the IGC
leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, agreement
was reached on a new Title (Title VII) laying
down the conditions under which a majority of
member states6  can establish closer coopera-
tion between themselves, making use of the
institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid
down by the Treaties. The negotiations were
difficult as cooperation amongst a smaller group
inevitably implies the exclusion of some of the
players.7  Especially the Euro-sceptic countries
were afraid to be reduced to second-class mem-
bers. To safeguard the position of the non-par-
ticipating countries, the conditions for enhanced
cooperation were defined very narrowly, to the
extent even that the articles in question have
until now not been applied. It remains to be seen
whether this will change after the entering into
force of the Treaty of Nice, which relaxed the
conditions (Galloway 2001, 133, 142).
In the area of Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), the debate has been dominated
by the discussions on the formation of a direc-
torate amongst the three biggest member states
France, Germany and the United Kingdom.8
One of the proposals suggests the formation of
a Security Council as in the United Nations
whereby some of the big member states would
be permanent members whereas membership for
the others would be on the basis of rotation. A
differentiation on the basis of size is an ex-
tremely sensitive matter and proposals in this
direction have only made the smaller countries
more determined in their fight to defend the prin-
ciple of equality amongst the member states.
The debate on cores and coalitions also lin-
gers on in the current discussion on the future
of Europe. The German Minister of Foreign
Affairs Joschka Fischer, in his much debated
speech at the Humboldt University (Fischer
2000), talks about a centre of gravity, composed
of a group of states who would conclude a new
European framework Treaty; Jacques Chirac
pleads for the development of a pioneer group
(Chirac 2000) and the former President of the
European Commission Jacques Delors advo-
cates the formation of an avant garde (Delors
2001). Although they dont necessarily agree
on the role and the institutional basis for such
core, the fact that they all mention the issue in
their blueprints on the future Europe shows that
the last word about closer cooperation amongst
a smaller group of countries has not been said
yet. The imminent enlargement to a Union of
27 makes the discussion all the more topical.
This paper focuses on the Benelux, an exam-
ple of closer cooperation amongst a group of
countries in the same geographical area. Gen-
erally, regional partnerships are, however, based
on more than just having common borders.
Other elements such as size, relative power, a
common history or a similar level of economic
development may also play a role. Before look-
ing at the recent attempts of the Benelux coun-
tries to co-operate, the relationship of the three
countries in the framework of the EC/EU will
be placed in a historical perspective.
3. The Benelux and the Early Years of
European integration9
For most observers the Benelux is inextrica-
bly linked with the process of European inte-
gration itself.10  As a customs union between
9Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, it
is often seen as a precursor of the European
Communities, promoting trade between neigh-
bouring countries by abolishing tariff barriers
and disposing of its own institutional framework
including a Court of Justice. Furthermore, it was
the Benelux memorandum presented at a meet-
ing of the Foreign Affairs Ministers in Messina
in June 1955 that re-launched the debate on
European integration. A committee under the
chairmanship of the Belgian Minister of For-
eign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak prepared the re-
port that ultimately led to the establishment of
the European Economic Community (EEC) and
Euratom. Another well-known European event
on which the Benelux countries had a major
impact were the Fouchet negotiations on Politi-
cal Union. Belgium and the Netherlands vetoed
de Gaulles proposals to organise political co-
operation on a purely intergovernmental basis.
Both episodes in these early years of Euro-
pean integration deserve some closer attention
because they give us some concrete indications
with regard to the cooperation between the three
small founding member states. As a matter of
fact, the denomination Benelux memorandum
(1955) is quite misleading. The text was not
drafted in the framework of the Benelux organi-
sation nor was it the result of a joint effort of
the three countries elaborating a common ini-
tiative (Duchêne 1994, 262ff.). Following the
crisis provoked by the rejection by the French
national assembly of the draft treaty for a Euro-
pean Defence Community (EDC), the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak
and his Dutch counterpart Johan Beyen, each
separately had started to draft proposals for a
relaunch. Spaak, in close consultation with
Monnet, had elaborated proposals around the
concept of sectoral integration; Beyen on the
other hand favoured the idea of general eco-
nomic integration and the creation of a com-
mon market. Following his famous letter of 4
April 1955 to Spaak in which Beyen explained
his ideas, the two combined their respective
approaches in a joint proposal for a common
market and a new Community for civil nuclear
power. The Luxembourg Minister of Foreign
Affairs Joseph Bech, who was informed after-
wards, was initially opposed to Beyens proposal
for an economic community. He feared that its
organisation on a supranational basis would be
detrimental for a small country like Luxem-
bourg, but he was ultimately convinced to join
forces (Brouwer/Pijpers 1999, 105; Trausch
1996, 122f.).
Also in the case of the Fouchet proposals there
was initially no question of a joint position
amongst the Benelux countries. Although they
shared the Dutch concern about the intergov-
ernmental character of de Gaulles Political
Union, first proposed at a press conference on 5
September 1960, Belgium and Luxembourg
were much more positive towards the French
proposals than were the Netherlands. From the
first meeting onwards the Dutch Minister of
Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns made it clear that
The Hague would radically oppose a Political
Union of which the United Kingdom would be
excluded. The British participation had to ad-
dress a double concern: it had to prevent the
domination of the Political Union by France and
Germany; secondly it had to guarantee a close
link with the Atlantic Alliance.11  Belgium ini-
tially took a much more conciliatory stance, but
hardened its position when in January 1962 the
French presented the so-called Fouchet II pro-
posal, which totally ignored their concerns with
regard to the relationship of the Political Union
with the European Communities and the Atlan-
tic Alliance. When in April 1962 the British
themselves asked to be associated with the talks
on Political Union, Belgium joined the Dutch
in their request for British EC membership as a
precondition for the establishment of a Political
Union, ultimately leading to a suspension of the
negotiations on 17 April 1962 (Vanhoonacker
1989).
The two abovementioned episodes in the early
history of European integration provide us with
some first interesting insights. Contrary to the
questions that were related to the subject matter
of the Benelux treaty (trade, borders, regional
cooperation), more political questions on the
further development of the EC were not dealt
with in the framework of the Benelux institu-
tions but on a rather loose and ad hoc basis, with
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs playing a key
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role in the co-ordination of positions. This co-
ordination task proved sometimes rather diffi-
cult. In the case of the Fouchet proposals for
example, it is not until the negotiations have
been going on for several months that the three
finally agree on a memorandum that is to be the
basis for their joint position. Even then they
hardly succeed to hide their divergences (Van-
hoonacker 1989, 518).
In both cases the motivation for their coop-
eration differs. For the Benelux memorandum
of 1955, it was in the first place the desire to
give a new impetus to the European integration
process which spurred a joint initiative. In the
case of the Fouchet negotiations, it was prima-
rily the fear for domination by the Franco-
German axis that made Belgium and the Nether-
lands join forces. They hoped to prevent such
predominance by guaranteeing British member-
ship of the Political Union and by equipping the
Union with a supranational and independent
body such as the European Commission. The
latter was seen as indispensable for the defence
of the interests of the smaller member states.
The reticence of the small member states with
regard to intergovernmental bodies would per-
sist. When in the early 1970s France proposed
regular meetings of the Heads of State and
Government in the framework of the European
Council, it was the Netherlands who insisted that
its creation be counterbalanced by the introduc-
tion of direct elections for the European Parlia-
ment.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Benelux coun-
tries remain active participants in the European
integration process through initiatives such as
the Werner report on Economic and Monetary
Union (Luxembourg), the Tindemans report
(Belgium), and the Davignon report on Euro-
pean Political Cooperation (Belgium). Although
the Benelux countries contributed in a signifi-
cant way to initiatives such as the Single Euro-
pean Act and the Schengen agreement, most of
the projects on which they had a major impact
were unilateral rather than joint initiatives. Sev-
eral factors may have played a role. With the
realisation of the customs union in 1968, one of
the central objectives of the Benelux had been
attained within the framework of the Six and
the dynamism of the earlier years faded away.
Although the Benelux countries are often men-
tioned as if they were one block, there are im-
portant differences amongst them. In the politi-
cal field for example, the Netherlands took an
Atlanticist line, while Belgium and Luxembourg
tended to be more supportive of a Europeanist
view. In the economic area, The Hague was gen-
erally much more liberal than Belgium and Lux-
embourg. The question arises whether the Lux-
embourg compromise and the accession of the
United Kingdom are also explanatory factors for
the reduced cooperation? One could argue that
the smaller countries felt less threatened because
London provided the long awaited counterbal-
ance vis-à-vis France and Germany and because
the Luxembourg compromise guaranteed that
they could always invoke a veto when vital in-
terests were at stake. Or perhaps there were sim-
ply few joint initiatives because the three coun-
tries felt rather comfortable in the European
Communities and they didnt see a real need to
join forces.
Although the absence of joint approaches à
trois is partly compensated by the numerous
bilateral contacts, it is not until the major
changes brought about by the fall of the Berlin
Wall that the cooperation between the Benelux
countries gets a new impetus.12
4. Common concerns and views
Since the mid-1990s the Benelux countries
have again tried to cooperate on a number of
questions. The most visible expression of this
renewed attempt to coordinate positions are the
joint memoranda that have been represented at
the Intergovernmental Conferences leading to
the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice and the texts
on the future of the EU.13  That these three found-
ing countries again feel the need to present a
common front has everything to do with the
breath-taking developments on the European
continent in 1989 and with their changing posi-
tion in the EU as a result of these events. Also
domestic factors have played a role.
Although history rarely knows real breaks, it
cannot be denied that the fall of the Berlin Wall
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constituted a major shock for the European
Communities and that at this moment its mem-
ber states are still digesting the consequences.
While the Twelve were initially primarily think-
ing in terms of concluding association agree-
ments with the former communist countries of
Central Europe, it soon became clear that the
latter aspired nothing less than EU membership.
Conscious of its positive impact on the stability
of the European continent, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands strongly support the
expansion of the European Union. At the same
time however, they realise that it will strongly
change the nature of the EU and affect their own
position. Having always been strong advocates
of European integration, they fear that increas-
ing diversity and divergence of interests will
water down the process, reducing the EU to
nothing more than a glorified free trade area.
Secondly, they are concerned that as small
countries it will become increasingly difficult
to be heard and to have an impact on the direc-
tion of the EU. In a Union of 27 they will only
represent 8.4% of the votes compared to 13.7%
in the EU15 (and to 29.5% in the Europe of Six)
(Hösli 1995). Also in the European Commis-
sion, they will not always be represented since
participation in a Union of 27 or more will take
place on the basis of the principle of rotation.
Even the future of the Presidency, one of the
key symbols of equality amongst the member
states is under pressure and might in the future
be abandoned for a different type of set-up.
Thirdly, the three share a concern about the
future position of the European Commission.
The development of two new intergovernmen-
tal pillars (CFSP and JHA) in Maastricht and
the lack of leadership since the departure of
Jacques Delors has considerably weakened the
position of this institution, traditionally seen as
the defender of the small countries interests.
Also the trend whereby an intergovernmental
body as the European Council plays an increas-
ingly central role in steering the EU is consid-
ered to be primarily in the advantage of the big
members.
The increasing concern about being domi-
nated by the bigger countries has also been
spurred by the discussions about a directorate
in the area of CFSP. The formation of a Contact
Group for the former Yugoslavia, in which only
the four larger EU member states were repre-
sented,14  was a slap in the face of the smaller
ones. It is feared that this will be the beginning
of a new trend whereby the big member states
will increasingly act outside the EU framework
in major international crises. The mini-summits
amongst the big three during the Afghan crisis
only reinforced these fears.
Besides concerns about their future power
position, growing intergovernmentalism and the
further direction of European integration, there
are also domestic factors that have positively
influenced the re-launching of the Benelux co-
operation. Following the formation in 1994 of
a coalition of liberals, socialists and the Demo-
crats 66 (D66) in the Netherlands,15  fears were
arising that pressure from the eurosceptic liber-
als would loosen the Dutch commitment to the
European integration process. The socialists and
D66 saw closer cooperation with their Belgian
and Luxembourg partners as a possible way to
counter such development (see also Bossaert/
Vanhoonacker 2000, 174).
Last but not least, one has to take into account
that the smooth functioning of the rather ad hoc
and informal cooperation between the three
countries depends to a large extent on a good
mutual understanding of the key political ac-
tors. The recent strengthening of Benelux could
not have been realised without the excellent re-
lations between the Prime Ministers Kok,
Dehaene (and later Verhofstadt) and Juncker.
Koks successor, Jan Peter Balkenende, seems
to want to continue the cooperation.
5. Concrete cases of cooperation
The most visible and concrete expressions of
the renewed attempts of the Benelux to coordi-
nate positions are the various joint memoranda
that have been published since 1996. Six of them
represent joint positions with regard to Inter-
governmental Conferences and the further de-
velopment of the Union;16  two are dedicated to
the area of Justice and Home Affairs.17  The
question that dominates the first group of memo-
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randa is how to come to a more efficient, demo-
cratic and transparent Union. Themes receiv-
ing a central place are: the further deepening of
European integration, the possible need for dif-
ferentiation and the absolute necessity for a solid
institutional underpinning of the EU.
The texts welcome the Unions enlargement
but underline the need to counterbalance it with
a further deepening. Priority areas are the com-
pletion of the internal market, external policy,
justice and home affairs as well as employ-
ment.18  A recurrent topic is the need to become
more prominent on the international scene. The
Benelux countries plead for more consistency
between the pillars, a strengthened role for the
Commission in CFSP and decision-making by
qualified majority. During the IGC leading to
Amsterdam they advocated a gradual merger of
the WEU into the EU and they supported the
incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the
Treaty.
The three have also at several occasions ex-
pressed frustration with regard to the slow
progress in the third pillar. In Amsterdam they
defended the incorporation of asylum and mi-
gration into the Community pillar, and pleaded
for the incorporation of Schengen into the Treaty
framework. The Benelux countries have also
dedicated two separate memoranda to the area
of Justice and Home Affairs. Prior to the Euro-
pean Council of Tampere, they presented a joint
contribution outlining the priority areas for ac-
tion with regard to the realisation of a space of
freedom, security and justice.19  In March 2001,
they made a list of proposals on the table and
indicated a deadline by which political agree-
ment or adoption should be achieved. It is also
stated that the Benelux will try to better coordi-
nate its positions in these fields, although in
practice this has proven to be difficult.20
A second recurring theme is that of differen-
tiation or what the Treaty of Amsterdam has
called closer cooperation. In the memorandum
presented briefly after the start of the 199697
IGC, the Benelux countries argue that in an en-
larged Union, differentiation will be unavoid-
able. Cooperation amongst a core of countries
in a certain policy area should, however, not
undermine the acquis communautaire, provide
a central role for the European Commission and
be organised within the Treaty framework. An
à la carte Europe whereby countries just pick
and chose from the menu on an ad hoc basis is
rejected. Closer cooperation is also an impor-
tant theme in the memorandum presented just
before the European Council of Helsinki (10
11 December 1999). The three are of the opin-
ion that the conditions for enhanced coopera-
tion as defined in Amsterdam were too strict and
they advocated their relaxation in the IGC 2000.
They also favoured their extension to the sec-
ond pillar. As we will see below, the Benelux
played a key role in the debate on the relaxation
of the flexibility conditions.
In the discussions on the institutional reform
of the EU, the Benelux countries manifest
themselves as strong defenders of the Commu-
nity method according to which the European
Commission has the exclusive right of initia-
tive. The Commission is seen as the body that
is best placed to serve the general EU interest
and its position should therefore be further
strengthened. In the memorandum to the Con-
vention (December 2002), it is proposed that
in the future the President of the Commission
is elected by the European Parliament and con-
firmed by the European Council deciding by
qualified majority.21  The Benelux countries
also express their preference for a reduced-size
Commission where seats rotate on the basis of
equality.
The strengthened position of the European
Parliament and its role as co-legislator in an in-
creasing number of areas is very much wel-
comed and seen as a way to come to a more
democratic Union. But also the national parlia-
ments should become more active and follow
Commission proposals more closely. The three
dont want to create any new institutions involv-
ing national parliamentarians and they reject
Giscards idea for a Congress of peoples, com-
posed of representatives of the EP and the na-
tional parliaments.
Briefly before the European Council of Se-
ville, the three countries have also presented
their views on the reform of the Council. They
plead for a better preparation of the European
Council, oppose the creation of a new Council
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formation of Deputy Prime Ministers and they
advocate a careful analysis of the pros and cons
of the current Presidency system before giving
it up for an alternative system.22  The future of
the Presidency was one of the central themes of
discussion during the preparations of the memo-
randum of December 2002. While the Nether-
lands strongly argued in favour of maintaining
a system based on rotation, the Belgian Prime
Minister Verhofstadt did not want to exclude an
opening to the proposal of France, the UK and
Spain to have an elected chair of the European
Council. After some fierce discussions, this led
to a compromise whereby the three advocated
to maintain the principle of rotation, adding that
a longer term Presidency of the Council is only
acceptable if elected amongst the members of
that body.
The co-ordination of positions and the at-
tempts to present a common front through
memoranda does not imply that the three speak
with one voice on every single aspect of the fur-
ther development of the EU. Each also presented
national contributions to the various IGCs and
to the Convention. By joining forces, the Ben-
elux hopes to give more weight to issues they
consider important and to contribute to the steer-
ing of the EU in their preferred direction. The
abovementioned discussion on the future of the
Presidency illustrates that it is not always easy
to come up with common positions. Also, when
it comes to highly sensitive questions such as
the re-weighing of the votes, the national reflex
is predominant and both in Amsterdam23  as well
as in Nice,24  this led to a direct confrontation
between Belgium and the Netherlands. While
the latter (16 million inhabitants) advocated a
differentiation in votes between the two coun-
tries, Belgium (10 million inhabitants) wanted
to maintain parity. The incident illustrates that
despite the willingness to support each other,
national interests will always prevail.
The abovementioned discussions around the
re-weighting of votes have caused some strain
in the relations between the Netherlands and
Belgium, but these internal squirms have not
prevented the cooperation to continue and their
joint efforts have not been without success.
There are at least two examples where the Ben-
elux countries by joining forces have been able
to seriously influence the EU debate. The Neth-
erlands who held the Presidency during the fi-
nal six months of the 199697 IGC played a
key role in integrating Schengen into the Treaty.
It very skilfully relied on the support of the other
two countries to steer the negotiations in the
preferred direction and ultimately managed to
reach agreement on a protocol incorporating
Schengen into the Treaty framework (see
Schout/Vanhoonacker, forthcoming).
A second and probably the most visible ex-
ample of an impact of the Benelux countries on
the European debate has been that of the ex-
pansion of the agenda of the IGC 2000 beyond
the three leftovers of Amsterdam (composition
of the European Commission, extension of
qualified majority voting and re-weighting of
the votes). At the European Council of Helsinki
the Benelux countries pleaded for an extended
agenda including the relaxation of the condi-
tions for closer cooperation. Initially they only
had the support of Italy and the European Com-
mission, but gradually they managed to con-
vince others, including France, Germany and
the Portuguese Presidency (first half of 2000).
By the end of the Portuguese Presidency the
Fifteen agreed to put closer cooperation on the
IGC agenda.
It would be a misrepresentation of reality and
grossly exaggerated to accredit the above-men-
tioned achievements entirely to the efforts of
the Benelux. Decisions in the EU are a process
of give and take whereby it is key to have the
support of as many member states as possible,
especially that of the bigger ones. Nevertheless
by joining forces and presenting strong argu-
ments the Benelux could convince other coun-
tries to join them in their position and as a re-
sult they had more impact on the debate than if
they would have been alone in defending a po-
sition.
6. No ‘ménage a trois’
The multiple joint memoranda that have been
published over recent years seem to suggest that
the cooperation amongst Belgium, Luxembourg
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and the Netherlands is more than an isolated
event. The question arises what the prospects
for longer-term cooperation are. So far the at-
tempts to speak with one voice have not been
underpinned by an institutional framework and
meetings take primarily place at the higher lev-
els. Twice a year there is a summit meeting at
the level of the Prime Ministers, accompanied
by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Min-
isters of European Affairs of the three countries.
In addition there is also an exchange of views
on the margins of European Councils. The ad-
vantage of the cooperation is that it is organised
in a very flexible way and that there is little red
tape. Undoubtedly this very pragmatic approach
is one of the keys to the success of the coopera-
tion. On the other hand it raises the question
what will happen when the current Prime Min-
isters will be replaced by other players who have
less affinity with each other. Experiences with
the Franco-German axis have shown that espe-
cially in times of crisis, the presence of more
permanent structures can be very important to
sustain cooperation.
Nevertheless, even without a firm institutional
underpinning, the circumstances for a continu-
ing close relationship are rather favourable. The
prospect of a Union of 27 or more member states
will definitely change the position of these three
founding member states and if they still want to
have some weight, they will be forced to look
for allies and form coalitions. Their geographi-
cal proximity and their common concern to pre-
vent a watering down of the European integra-
tion process make them obvious partners. Suc-
cesses such as their positive influence on ex-
tending the IGC 2000 agenda are encouraging
to continue on the current road. The coopera-
tion amongst Benelux countries is also open to
other member states. During the Belgian Presi-
dency (second half 2001), the three have also
tried to develop a dialogue with the Visegrad
group, another regional partnership. In Decem-
ber 2001 the Prime Ministers and Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the two groups held an in-
formal meeting in Luxembourg during which
they discussed the future of Europe. Consider-
ing the rather loose cooperation amongst the
Visegrad group, it remains rather doubtful
whether the dialogue between the two groups
will be long-lived.25  It remains, however, that
candidate countries such as the Baltic states and
the Visegrad group see the Benelux as an in-
spiring example as how to co-operate more
closely in the EU framework.
The cooperation between Benelux countries
is far from all encompassing and there continue
to exist important economic, political and cul-
tural divergences amongst these three founding
member states. The Netherlands is the most lib-
eral of the three and in dossiers of liberalisa-
tion, its position is often more aligned with that
of countries such as the United Kingdom. Bel-
giums blueprint of the EU is that of a Euro-
pean federation and when cooperating in the
Benelux forum it has to milder its ambitions.26
The French speaking Belgians are not so eager
to cooperate in the Benelux because they see it
as a Dutch speaking club.
Also the different size of the countries is some-
times an obstacle for cooperation. The Nether-
lands whose population and economy rank sixth
in the EU has a different position than that of
Luxembourg, which is the smallest EU mem-
ber state. The Hague wears the double hat of
being the biggest of the smallest and the small-
est of the biggest member states. As smallest of
the biggest it likes to manifest itself as the de-
fender of the interests of the small. In the dis-
cussions on the future composition of the Euro-
pean Commission and the re-weighting of the
votes during the IGC 2000, it defended a posi-
tion that was in line with that of other small
member states.27  In other cases, however,  and
foreign policy is a case in point  the Nether-
lands likes to see itself as the smallest of the
big. When Prime Minister Kok was not invited
to the mini-summit organised by Tony Blair in
London in early November 2001 to discuss the
results of his trip to the Middle East, he decided
to invite himself.28  He was the only of the
smaller countries not accepting the proposal of
Prime Minister Verhofstadt that the Belgian
Presidency would represent them at the meet-
ing. When it comes to military cooperation at
the European level, the Netherlands has a pref-
erence to cooperate with countries such as the
United Kingdom and Germany.
15
The Benelux coalition is far from being ex-
clusive. The cooperation has to be seen in the
framework of a broader strategy of the three
countries to intensify their bilateral and multi-
lateral relations with the objective of better de-
fending their national positions and exert influ-
ence on the future direction of the EU. In the
Netherlands for example, the closer cooperation
with Belgium and Luxembourg is part of a so-
called buurlandenbeleid, aimed at developing
closer links not only with the small but also with
the big neighbours (buurlanden) like France,
Germany and the United Kingdom. In a speech
at the Dutch Society for International Affairs
the former Dutch State Secretary for European
Affairs Dick Benschop has been pleading for a
networking approach.29  In an increasingly di-
vergent and heterogeneous Europe where deals
are more and more reached outside the formal
meetings of Ministers or Heads of State and
Government, The Hague wants to avoid becom-
ing marginalised. As a middle-sized country, it
aims to become an important partner in a broad
European network comprising not only the EU
member states but also the candidate countries.30
In the area of the environment for example, the
Netherlands is cooperating with the Scandi-
navian member states (see Bossaert/Van-
hoonacker 2000, 182). The same trend of in-
tensifying contacts with other EU member
states, and not only with the traditional partners
France and Germany, is also apparent in Lux-
embourg. With the goal of fostering the influ-
ence of the smallest Benelux member in the EU,
the Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker stressed
in the declaration of the new government in June
1999 that it is highly important for the Grand-
Duchy to invest more in bilateral relations with
its EU partners.31
Concluding, one could repeat the question put
forward by Professor A.E. Kersten in a Ben-
elux study (1982) and ask whether by closely
cooperating the three equate the influence of one
big member state? In our view the answer to
that question is negative (Bossaert/Vanhoon-
acker 2000, 183). Firstly there is no political
support in the respective countries to give the
cooperation such a central place. Benelux co-
operation is not an aim in itself but one of the
multiple instruments used to make sure that na-
tional interests are being heard and possibly
taken into account. This also explains why no
serious attempts have been made to further in-
stitutionalise the cooperation. The actors in-
volved consider the flexible organisation and the
pragmatic approach as a strength and not as a
weakness. Furthermore, the Benelux countries
dont want to be reduced to one block. The com-
mittee of wise men, a Benelux reflection group,
acknowledged the risks for the three countries
of acting too openly as a single bloc during the
199697 IGC, warning that the common posi-
tion could be translated into one Benelux mem-
ber in the Commission, or one Benelux Presi-
dency of the Council. In this regard, too close
cooperation could even be counterproductive
(Pijpers/Vanhoonacker 1997, 137). In any case,
even if the three countries would wish to give
more priority to attuning their positions, it would
be highly unlikely that this could be realised.
The interests of the three do not necessarily al-
ways coincide and as we have seen in the dos-
sier of the re-weighting of the votes, the first
priority continues to be the defence of ones own
position and interests. Thirdly it would certainly
be an illusion to assume that close cooperation
would add up to the same influence as that of
France or Germany. The power base of the Ben-
elux in terms of population, military force, is
not strong enough to acquire big power status.
Their ability to exert influence will therefore to
a large extent continue to depend on their abil-
ity to rally other countries behind their position.
By joining forces their chances to be heard will
however be much bigger than when acting uni-
laterally.
NOTES
1 The Benelux organisation is not involved and plays
no role in the cooperation between the three coun-
tries in the EU framework.
2 Benelux Memorandum on the Intergovernmental
Conference, 5 May 1996.
Benelux Memorandum on the Intergovernmental
Conference, 8 December 1999.
Benelux Memorandum on the IGC and on the Fu-
ture of the European Union, 29 September 2000.
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Benelux Memorandum on the Future of Europe, 22
June 2001.
Preparation of the European Council of Sevilla: Ben-
elux Memorandum on the reform of the Council, 4
June 2002.
Memorandum of the Benelux. A balanced institu-
tional framework for an enlarged, more effective and
more transparent Union, Brussels, 4 December 2002.
3 Mémorandum des pays Benelux pour le Conseil
européen de Tampere, 6 October 1999.
Mémorandum Benelux en matière de Justice et
Affaires Intérieures en vue du Sommet de Laeken,
March 2001.
4 Based on the title of a study by Pijpers (2000).
5 The Schäuble-Lamers paper was not an official docu-
ment of the German government but it is hard to
imagine that it had not first been seen and approved
by Chancellor Kohl.
6 In the Nice Treaty the minimum number has been
reduced to 8 (currently still a majority of the mem-
ber states but after enlargement this will be less than
half).
7 For an overview of the negotiations on flexibility both
in Amsterdam and Nice, see Stubb (2002).
8 On the discussions of a directorate, see Keukeleire
(2000).
9 This part of the article has been taken from Bossaert/
Vanhoonacker (2000, 170ff.).
10 On the Benelux and the early years of European in-
tegration, see Bloemen (1992).
11 On the Dutch position towards de Gaulles propos-
als for a Political Union, see Nijenhuis (1987).
12 See the chapters België by Schreurs (1999) and
Luxemburg by Brouwer/Pijpers (1999).
13 See note 2.
14 Besides Russia and the US, only France, Germany,
Italy, the United Kingdom were members of the Con-
tact Group.
15 This coalition is also known as the purple coali-
tion.
16 See note 2.
17 Mémorandum des pays Benelux pour le Conseil
européen de Tampere, 6 October 1999. Mémorandum
Benelux en matière de Justice et Affaires Intérieures
en vue du Sommet de Laeken, March 2001.
18 Even though it is still primarily a national responsi-
bility, it is argued that national employment policies
should be better coordinated and that the provisions
in the Treaty on the complementary role of the EU
should be made more explicit.
19 Mémorandum des pays Benelux pour le Conseil
européen de Tampere, 6 October 1999.
20 Mémorandum Benelux en matière de Justice et
Affaires Intérieures en vue du Sommet de Laeken,
March 2001.
21 Memorandum of the Benelux. A balanced institu-
tional framework for an enlarged, more effective and
more transparent Union, Brussels, 4 December 2002.
22 Preparation of the European Council of Sevilla: Ben-
elux Memorandum on the reform of the Council, 4
June 2002.
23 The Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene was furious in
Amsterdam (June 1997) when at the very last mo-
ment the Dutch Presidency proposed a modification
of the current weighting system in the Council fa-
vouring the big Member States, without consulting
Belgium. This proposal would have meant an end to
the parity between Belgium and the Netherlands,
which at that moment each had 5 votes. According
to the Dutch proposal in Amsterdam, the four big
Member States would have 25 votes, Spain 20, the
Netherlands 12, Belgium 10 and Luxembourg three.
24 The position of Belgium in the IGC 2000 was that it
would only accept a differentiation in votes between
the Netherlands and Belgium if a distinction would
also be made between France and Germany (which
was unacceptable for France!). The Netherlands and
Prime Minister Kok fiercely fought for an extra vote
and in Nice The Hague finally received one more
vote than Belgium. Relations between the two coun-
tries came under serious strain.
25 Summit Meeting between Benelux and the Visegrad
Group, Luxembourg, December 2001 (Press State-
ment).
26 Even then the liberal members of the second cham-
ber in The Hague found the Benelux memorandum
on the Future of Europe too ambitious. In: Kritiek
VVD op Benelux-Memorandum, in: @Europa 7, 1-
2.
27 The small member states defended the position that
also in an enlarged Union each member state should
have one Commissioner. Later on, some of them,
including the Netherlands, supported a rotating mem-
bership at the condition that it would be based on the
principle of equality.
28 Initially only the French President Jacques Chirac
and the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had
been invited; the Spanish and Italian Prime Minis-
ters had only been called at the last moment.
29 For the text of his contribution, see Benschop (2000).
30 On the Netherlands and the increasing importance
of bilateralism in its foreign policy, see Pijpers (1999).
31 Declaration of government of 12 August 1999, by
Jean-Claude Juncker, 3. See also Bossaert and
Vanhoonacker (2000, 182f.).
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